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Abstract—This paper presents a new technique for providing
the analysis and comparison of wiretap codes in the small
blocklength regime over the binary erasure wiretap channel.
A major result is the development of Monte Carlo strategies
for quantifying a code’s equivocation, which mirrors techniques
used to analyze normal error correcting codes. For this paper,
we limit our analysis to coset-based wiretap codes, and make
several comparisons of different code families at small and
medium blocklengths. Our results indicate that there are security
advantages to using specific codes when using small to medium
blocklengths.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increased number of automated and wireless
devices in use today, it appears that the internet of things (IoT)
is slowly, but surely, becoming a reality. With the increased
flexibility and convenience that the IoT promises to bring
about, come also a plethora of security and privacy issues.
For one, the IoT will be comprised of power-constrained
devices; for two, these devices will likely need only short
packets to communicate a large proportion of transmitted
data; and for three, communications will need to have low
latency to cope with small memory sizes on smaller connected
devices [1]. The architectures currently deployed in commu-
nication systems are unsuited for this new environment, as
they typically rely on large blocklength coding schemes for
reliability, including interleaving techniques that bring about
added latency, and power-hungry and complicated algorithms
for secret key exchange and/or cryptography. Thus, there is a
current need for low-power secrecy algorithms that can make
security guarantees over short blocklengths.
This work was partially funded by the following entities and projects: the
US National Science Foundation (Grant Award Number 1460085), project
PTDC/EEI-TEL/3684/2014 (SWING2 - Securing Wireless Networks with
Coding and Jamming) co-funded by COMPETE 2020 and Portugal 2020 -
Programa Operacional Competitividade e Internacionalizac¸a˜o (POCI), Euro-
pean Union through Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER)
and Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia (FCT), the FLAD project INCISE
(Interference and Coding for Secrecy), and by Portuguese FCT under project
UID/EEA/50008/2013.
One technique that may prove itself to be a nice match for
many security and privacy issues in the IoT is that of wiretap
(or secrecy) coding [2], [3] for physical-layer security [4], [5].
The general idea of such techniques is to code data in such
a way that the channel over which an eavesdropper observes
communciations naturally secures the data transmission, while
also allowing reliability over other communications channels
for legitimate receivers.
If coding for secrecy is to prove itself adequate for solving
the security issues inherent in the IoT, it must be better
understood how these codes perform in the finite blocklength
regime, particularly with very short blocklengths. Tradition-
ally, wiretap codes are evaluated and analyzed as blocklengths
approach infinity using information theoretic security mea-
sures. Let a message M be encoded into a length n codeword
Xn for transmission across a communications channel. The
eavesdropper observes a possibly noisy version of Xn denoted
by Zn. Data are transmitted with weak secrecy [4] if the
leakage rate of information about the message goes to zero
in the limit; that is,
1
n
I(M ;Zn)→ 0 as n→∞. (1)
Data are communicated with strong secrecy [6], [7] if the
total amount of leaked information about the original mes-
sage approaches zero as blocklength approaches infinity, or
equivalently
I(M ;Zn)→ 0 as n→∞. (2)
While a majority of secrecy coding structures (e.g., [2], [8],
[9]) make use of these measures to classify their security
achievements, we argue that a new approach in the finite
blocklength regime, beginning with extremely short block-
length codes, would be of great value. Furthermore, we wish
to actually quantify the total equivocation as a function of
channel parameters in the eavesdropper’s channel, rather than
only analyzing codes in the asymptotic blocklength regime.
In this paper, we analyze coset-based secrecy codes (as
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Fig. 1. The BEWC model has a noiseless main channel between Alice and
Bob, and a BEC eavesdropper’s channel.
originally presented in [4], [8]) over finite blocklengths to
quantify exactly (where possible) or estimate (using Monte
Carlo techniques) the precise amount of information-theoretic
security in terms of the equivocation
∆ = H(M |Z). (3)
In essence, we are proposing that finite blocklength secrecy
codes can be analyzed individually using simulation tech-
niques similar to those that create bit error rate (BER) curves
in generic error-control codes. In other words, when possible,
we can give the full equivocation, or bound it as appropriate;
but when these techniques fail, or when more precise security
measures are required at specific blocklengths, we can simply
estimate the equivocation using Monte Carlo simulations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II contains background information about the channel
model used throughout the paper, coset coding in general,
and a specific encoding and decoding algorithm. Section III
demonstrates how to quantify equivocation when using coset
coding techniques over binary erasure channels. Section IV in-
troduces a new parameter to compare finite-length codes with
the achievable secrecy limits under the infinite blocklength
assumption. Finally, Sections V and VI present empirical
results for different coset coding techniques and summarize
the major findings of the paper, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the channel model used for this
paper, as well as existing techniques for wiretap coding over
the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC).
A. Overview of Channel Model
The channel model assumed in this paper is a variant
of Wyner’s wiretap model [4] called the BEWC, which is
depicted in Fig. 1. In this model, Alice wishes to securely
transmit a binary message to Bob in the presence of Eve, an
eavesdropper who has full knowledge of the coding scheme
in use. Alice encodes a message M from the alphabet
M = {1, 2, . . . , 2k} into a corresponding n-bit codeword Xn
(n ≥ k). Alice transmits Xn to Bob through the main channel
of communication, and Bob receives Y n at the output of the
channel. From this observation, Bob decodes and forms his
estimate of the original message, denoted M ′. For the purposes
of this paper, the main channel is assumed to be noiseless, and
thus, Y n = Xn and M ′ = M . An eavesdropper named Eve
observes Zn through the eavesdropper’s channel, which is a
BEC with parameter . Each bit of Xn is erased by the channel
with probability  independent of all other bits, and erasures
are denoted as ‘?’ symbols.
TABLE I
CODEBOOK STRUCTURE OUTLINED IN EXAMPLE 1.
M Codewords
1 0000 0110 1001 1111
2 0001 0111 1000 1110
3 0010 0100 1011 1101
4 0011 0101 1010 1100
B. Overview of Coset Coding
In general, data should be encoded to minimize the proba-
bility of error for Bob and to restrict the amount of information
intercepted by Eve. Since the main channel is noiseless,
however, we need not worry about Bob. Secrecy over the
eavesdropper’s channel can be achieved through the coset
coding procedure described in [4], [11]. Let the messages,
M ∈M, be chosen uniformly at random. An (n, n−k) linear
block code C1 (also referred to as the base code) is chosen
that contains 2n−k n-bit codewords [12]. From C1, 2k cosets
(C1, C2, C3, . . . , C2k ) can be obtained. These cosets can be
formed by choosing an n-bit vector An /∈ C1 and adding it to
each codeword in C1 using addition over GF(2). This process
is repeated (ensuring now that An is also not a codeword in
another coset) until all 2k cosets are obtained. By Lagrange’s
Theorem of cosets [12], each coset will contain 2n−k n-bit
binary vectors. Each message is then assigned to a unique
coset, forming a codebook that contains every binary vector in
the n-bit space. To encode M , a codeword is chosen at random
from its corresponding coset and is transmitted as Xn. Since
the main channel is noiseless, Bob simply has to find Y n in
the codebook and map back to M . Eve also has access to the
codebook and can obtain M provided Zn allows her to rule
out all but one coset. If Zn contains erasures, it is possible to
achieve a measure of security further explored in Section III.
The following example depicts the encoding process and the
possible security benefits of coset coding.
Example 1. Let k = 2, and let the elements in M =
{1, 2, 3, 4} be equally likely. We choose the base code C1
to be the (4, 2) linear, block code containing the codewords
{0000, 0110, 1001, 1111}. Cosets are formed, and each mes-
sage is arbitrarily mapped to a corresponding coset resulting
in the codebook seen in Table I. Suppose we wish to transmit
m = 3. A codeword from the third coset is chosen at random,
for example 1011, and is transmitted as xn. Since the main
channel is noiseless, Bob receives yn = xn and he can map
yn = 1011 back to the message m = 3. Suppose that Eve
observes zn = 10??. Since each coset contains a codeword
consistent with zn Eve cannot rule out any cosets, and hence,
H(M |Zn = zn) = 2 bits, and Eve gains no information from
the observation.
C. Practical Encoding and Decoding Algorithm
A computationally efficient method for encoding and de-
coding data in the coset coding scheme was developed in [8].
The message M is mapped to k-bits and is now denoted as
Mk ∈ {0, 1}k. We first select an (n, n− k) linear block code
for C1 with generator matrix G and parity check matrix H .
The rows of H are denoted h1, h2, . . . , hk. We now create k
linearly independent n-bit vectors (q1, q2, . . . , qk) that satisfy
the following conditions
qi /∈ C1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, (4)
qih
T
i = 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, (5)
qih
T
j = 0 for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ k, i 6= j. (6)
The last two requirements ensure that the syndrome equals the
message. We will now create a matrix, G′, whose rows are
q1, q2, . . . , qk. We also generate a random (n − k) bit vector
v(n−k) for each transmission. The encoding procedure is a
simple matrix multiplication and is represented as
xn =
[
mk vn−k
] [G′
G
]
. (7)
Using this encoding procedure, mk determines the coset while
the particular codeword within the coset is determined by
vn−k. If it is assumed that yn is received erasure-free, the
receiver calculates the syndrome to obtain
sk = ynHT (8)
= xnHT (9)
=
[
mk vn−k
] [G′
G
]
HT (10)
= mk(G′HT ) + vn−k(GHT ) (11)
= mk, (12)
because (5) and (6) ensure that G′HT = Ik and GHT = 0 by
definition, where Ik is the k × k identity matrix. The authors
of [8] further reduce the complications required by the encoder
resulting in very efficient algorithms.
III. EQUIVOCATION CALCULATION OVER THE BEC
Let us now calculate H(M |Z) for an eavesdropper in our
system. Note that [13]
H(M |Zn) =
∑
zn∈Zn
p(zn)H(M |Zn = zn),
= E [H(M |Zn = zn)] ,
(13)
where Zn = {0, 1, ?}.
The expression H(M |Zn = zn) measures Eve’s level
of uncertainty regarding the message conditioned upon a
particular observation zn from the eavesdropper’s channel
and is measured in units of bits. Our goal is to maximize
Eve’s equivocation using coset coding. The following theorem
quantifies Eve’s equivocation for a specific observation zn
given the number of erasures, the placement of erasures, and
the generator matrix of C1.
Theorem 1. Assume Mk is chosen uniformly at random from
{0, 1}k. Let the (n, n− k) linear, block code C1 be the base
code to be used in the coset coding scheme. Let G, a binary
(n−k)×n matrix, be the generator matrix for C1. Consider an
instance of an eavesdropper’s observation zn ∈ {0, 1, ?}n. Let
µ represent the number of unerasured positions in observation
zn and let Gµ be a binary matrix with dimensions (n−k)×µ
whose columns correspond to the unerasured column indicies
of G. Then,
H(Mk|Zn = zn) = k − µ+ rank(Gµ). (14)
Proof: If Gµ has rank r, then there exist 2r ways to
fill in the revealed positions within the codewords of C1.
Due to the properties of cosets, there are also 2r ways to
fill in the the revealed positions within the codewords of
any and all solitary cosets. With this in mind, there exist
2n−k/2r = 2n−k−r possible codewords in each possible coset.
There must exist 2n−µ total codewords consistent with zn,
therefore, 2n−µ/(2n−k−r) cosets are consistent with zn. Since
all cosets are equally likely,
H(Mk|Zn = zn) = log2(2k−µ+r)
= k − µ+ rank(Gµ). (15)
It should be noted that this result is stronger than that given
in Theorem 2 of [8], which was derived from results in [11],
and a similar observation was made in [14].
Example 2. The base code used in Example 1 has the
following generator matrix
G =
[
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
]
.
Let us assume that the eavesdropper observes zn1 = w??w,
where w ∈ {0, 1} and its actual value is irrelevant. Using
Theorem 1, H(Mk|Zn = zn1 ) = 1 bit. However, if the
eavesdropper observes zn2 = ww??, H(Mk|Zn = zn2 ) = 2
bits. Notice that the codewords consistent with zn1 in Table I
are contained in only two of the four cosets, leaking one
bit of information, while the codewords consistent with zn2
are spread amongst all four cosets, leaking zero bits of
information.
IV. MONTE CARLO CHANNEL SIMULATION TECHNIQUE
It is true that the choice of C1 plays an important role in the
equivocation of Eve. Although for small codes H(M |Zn) may
be calculated exactly by cycling through all possible zn ∈ Zn
in (13) and using Theorem 1, this becomes computationally
infeasable as blocklength grows to even moderate lengths. To
estimate the security performance of any base code in the coset
coding scheme, a Monte Carlo simulation can be performed.
A. Methodology
Let G be the binary generator matrix with dimensions
(n − k) × n for C1. Recall that the eavesdropper’s channel
has probability of erasure . The equivocation of a particular
observation can be calculated using Theorem 1. This process
is repeated for a predetermined number of iterations, resulting
in an estimate of the average equivocation.
Lemma 1. The expected value of
Hˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(M |Z = zi), (16)
where N is the number of iterations in a Monte Carlo simu-
lation, is the true equivocation. Therefore, Hˆ is an unbiased
estimator of ∆ = H(M |Zn).
Proof: The expected value of Hˆ is
E[Hˆ] = E
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(M |Z = zi)
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E [H(M |Z = zi)]
= H(M |Z),
(17)
where the final line in the proof comes from (13).
Using the estimator Hˆ , the security performance of any
coset code can be thoroughly characterized by simulating
across a range of  values. Similar types of Monte Carlo
simulations have been used to characterize bit error rates
(BER) of forward error correcting codes [12], [15], so it should
not surprise us that simulation can be used to evaluate wiretap
codes.
B. Achievability Gap
Let C1 be the (n, n−k) linear, block code that will be used
as the base code in the coset coding scheme as before. In the
worst case scenario where zn contains zero erasures, all the
information is leaked to the eavesdropper, and H(M |Zn) = 0.
In the best case scenario, zn contains sufficient erasures such
that H(M |Zn) = k = H(M). It now makes sense to present
equivocation on a normalized scale, and we note that
∆
n
=
H(M |Zn)
n
(18)
is usually called the equivocation rate. Notice that this quantity
can be bounded as
0 ≤ H(M |Z
n)
n
≤ H(M)
n
= R, (19)
where R = k/n is called the secret information rate, using the
standard inequality rule of conditional entropy [13]. Further
note that the secrecy capacity Cs, defined as the supremum
of rates such that weak or strong secrecy can be achieved
while also maintaining reliable communications over the main
channel, is equal to  for the BEWC [8]. Thus, it is also true
that
H(M |Zn)
n
≤ . (20)
Combining (19) and (20) results in the overall bound of
0 ≤ H(M |Z
n)
n
≤ min(, R), (21)
which is depicted in Fig. 2. Since for finite values of n,
H(M |Zn)
n
∣∣∣
=R
< R, (22)
but ideal secrecy codes can certainly do no better than R in
the limit when  = R, we can effectively judge how closely
a finite blocklength code gets to approaching the asymptotic
secrecy supremum by considering the gap between H(M |Zn)
and R at  = R. Thus, we now define the achievability gap,
Ag , as
Ag = R− H(M |Z
n)
n
∣∣∣
=R
. (23)
Using Monte Carlo techniques, individual choices of C1 in a
coset coding scheme can now be compared side by side using
their entire equivocation rate curves, or using a single metric
Ag . Both of these are depicted in Fig. 2. As Ag gets smaller,
the equivocation rate curve also approaches the bound in (21),
which is best possible, even for infinite length codes. There-
fore, good secrecy codes and codes with larger blocklengths
will tend to have smaller Ag values. The achievability gap
is significant because it is the largest difference between the
equivocation rate bound in (21) and a code’s true equivocation
rate. A code’s equivocation rate is always a concave function
of  [13]. For 0 ≤  ≤ R the bound in (21) is a linear
function of . Therefore, the difference between the bound
and the code’s true equivocation rate will continue to grow
along this interval. Along the interval R ≤  ≤ 1 the bound in
(21) is a horizontal line. As are result, the difference between
the bound and the code’s true equivocation rate will shrink
along this interval. Logically, the largest difference between
the bound and the code’s true equivocation must occur at
 = R, precisely where the achievability gap is evaluated.
The concept of the achievability gap is best understood with
the following example.
Example 3. C1 is chosen to be the (7,4) Hamming code
with secret information rate R ≈ 0.4286. Since the block-
length is reasonably small, the equivocation rate can be
calculated exactly, as can all the equivocation rate curves
for every linear block code with n = 7 and k = 4. The
results of this experiment can be seen in Fig. 3. Notice
that 1nH(M |Zn)
∣∣∣
=0.4286
< R, as expected. For this code,
Ag ≈ 0.0812 bits. By inspection, it is easy to see that the
largest difference between the bound and the true equivocation
rate occurs at  = R. Careful inspection of the figure reveals
that Ag is actually minimized for (7,4) linear block codes in
the choice of C1 as the Hamming code.
V. CHARACTERIZING ALGEBRAIC AND RANDOM CODES
WITH SMALL TO MEDIUM BLOCKLENGTHS
In this section, we present recommendations on how to
characterize the security performance of small to medium
blocklength codes. Ideally, the true equivocation rate of a
code should be calculated through (13). From a computa-
tional resource standpoint, this is only feasible for codes with
blocklengths less than 10. For slightly larger codes, the logical
next step would be to place bounds on the true equivocation
rate. Steps toward bounding the true equivocation rate are
presenented in ??. We argue that for codes with blocklengths
larger that 10, performing a Monte Carlo simulation described
0 0.5 1
0
1 n
H
(M
|Z
n
)
 
 
Supremum of Equivocation Rate
True Equivocation Rate of Code
min(0, R)
Ag
Fig. 2. The achievability gap is the difference between the true equivocation
rate of a code and it’s supremum in the limit evaluated at  = R.
in Section IV is a valid method to estimate the security
performance of a code. However, due to the rank calculation
in (14), the Monte Carlo simulation method is computationally
expensive and is not feasible for codes with large blocklengths.
Finally, we believe calculating the achievability gap for codes
with large blocklengths gives some insight into the security
performance of a code since it measures the maximum dif-
ference between the code’s theoretical maximum equivocation
rate and its estimated equivocation rate. We explore some of
these ideas in the following subsections.
A. Calculating True Equivocation for Small Blocklengths
Example 3 from the last section may cause us to wonder
whether Hamming codes are, in fact, the best possible se-
crecy codes for their size parameters. By directly calculting
the equivocation rate (13), we have observed that Hamming
and simplex codes are the best performing codes for their
respective information rates. Figure 3 shows the equivocation
rate curves for every (7,4) linear block code in a coset coding
scheme, while Fig. 4 shows the curves for every (7,3) linear
block code. We note that the Hamming code wins among the
(7,4) codes, and its dual, the simplex code, wins among the
(7,3) codes for every value of . We also note in both figures
that some codes perform better than their counterparts at larger
values of  but perform worse than their counterparts at smaller
values of  and vice versa. This makes it difficult to rank
the codes in relation to one another (with the exception of
the Hamming and simplex codes). Noting that these algebraic
structures are quite interesting in a secrecy coding context,
in the next section we investigate larger Hamming and sim-
plex codes, and compare their equivocation rate curves and
achievability gaps to those of randomly generated codes.
B. Estimating Equivocation Rates for Small to Medium Block-
lengths
Using the Monte Carlo simulation technique described
earlier, experimental values of Ag for Hamming and simplex
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Fig. 3. Equivocation rate curves for all (7,4) linear block codes. The
Hamming code achieves the highest equivocation for all codes of this size.
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Fig. 4. Equivocation rate curves for all (7,3) linear block codes. The simplex
code achieves the highest equivocation for all codes of this size.
codes with larger blocklengths were obtained and are given
in Tables II and III. Here we note a general trend that
the achievability gap Ag shrinks as blocklength grows. This
makes sense, because Ag measures the difference between
a code’s equivocation rate and the supremum of achievable
equivocation rates, which is to be understood in the limit as
n→∞. Thus, larger codes should do better in general. The
full equivocation rate curves for the codes from each of these
TABLE II
ACHIEVABILITY GAPS FOR HAMMING CODES.
Blocklength R Ag (bits)
7 0.4286 0.0812
15 0.2667 0.0723
31 0.1613 0.0311
63 0.0952 0.0181
TABLE III
ACHIEVABILITY GAPS FOR SIMPLEX CODES.
Blocklength R Ag (bits)
7 0.5714 0.0779
15 0.7333 0.0526
31 0.8387 0.0305
63 0.9048 0.0179
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Fig. 5. Equivocation rate curves for Hamming codes of four different
blocklengths with upper bounds for each.
tables are given for both Hamming and simplex codes in Figs.
5 and 6, respectively.
We now increase the blocklength and generate codes ran-
domly so as to compare with these highly structured algebraic
codes. The random codes that we consider have a single
parameter α, and generators for these codes are constructed
such that each bit in the generator matrix is equal to one with
probability α, independent from all other bits. For blocklengths
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Fig. 6. Equivocation rate curves for simplex codes of four different
blocklengths with upper bounds for each.
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Fig. 7. Equivocation rate curves for (63,57) random codes (average case,
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Fig. 8. Equivocation rate curves for (31,5) random codes (average case, best
case, and worst case) and the (31,5) simplex code.
slightly larger than 10, we are no longer capable of calculating
equivocation exactly in any reasonable amount of time. Thus,
we employ the Monte Carlo techniques developed herein, and
find that simulations show random codes with α ≈ 0.5, tend
to have smaller Ag values. Simulations also show that the
(31,26) Hamming code slightly outperforms (31,26) random
codes with α ≈ 0.5. To test this, ten (31,26) random codes
with α ≈ 0.5 were created and tested using the Monte
Carlo simulation techniques. The average security performance
of these random codes compared to the (31,26) Hamming
code’s performance is shown in Fig. 7 with 95% confidence
intervals. Simulations further indicate that the (31,5) simplex
code outperforms (31,5) random codes with α ≈ 0.5. Again,
ten (31,5) random codes with α ≈ 0.5 were created and tested
using the Monte Carlo simulation techniques, and the results
can be viewed in Fig. 8. We expect the difference between
algebraic codes and randomly chosen codes to further shrink
for yet larger blocklengths, indicating that codes generated
somewhat randomly may be expected to perform within some
small difference to more optimized structures.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have presented the idea of simulating
equivocation rate curves using Monte Carlo techniques for
secrecy code performance comparison in the finite blocklength
regime, just as is commonly used to compare varying codes
and code ensembles for general error-control codes. We have
likewise presented a new parameter called the achievability
gap that compares the equivocation rate curve to the op-
timal equivocation rate only achievable in the asymptotic
blocklength regime. Small achievability gaps are preferable
to larger ones in real secrecy code designs, and we presented
some results for small blocklengths that indicated Hamming
and simplex codes may have optimal structures for secrecy.
However, as blocklength increased to even moderate sizes,
the differences between these codes and randomly generated
ones was small. However, as the IoT gradually requires us to
develop new, lightweight, and optimal security algorithms for
small packet sizes, finding best possible codes may still be
valuable.
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